Demand and capacity fluctuations are common for roads and other congestible facilities. With ongoing advances in pricing technology and ways of communicating information to prospective users, state-dependent congestion pricing is becoming increasingly practical. But it is still rare or nonexistent in many potential applications. One explanation is that people dislike uncertainty about how much they will pay. To explore this idea a model of reference-dependent preferences is developed based on Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) . Using a facility yields an "intrinsic" utility and a "gain-loss" utility measured relative to the probability distribution over states of utility outcomes. Two types of preferences are analyzed: bundled preferences in which gains and losses are perceived for overall utility, and unbundled preferences in which gains and losses are perceived separately for the toll and other determinants of utility.
INTRODUCTION
Demand and capacity fluctuations are common in road and air transportation, at recreational areas, in communications networks, and at other congestible facilities. According to the principles of social marginal cost pricing congestion tolls or admission fees at public facilities should vary with usage conditions. Private-sector operators also have an incentive to vary prices in order to ration demand profitably and maintain service quality. Reliable service and predictable waiting or service times are often highly valued by consumers. For example, drivers are strongly averse to travel time uncertainty (De Palma and Picard, 2005) and consider unpredictable travel time more onerous than predictable time (Small et al., 2005) . Statedependent pricing can help to alleviate uncertainty by reducing both the average level and the variability of demand at peak times.
State-dependent pricing is widespread in the air travel, hotel, and some other industries. Yet despite advances in pricing technology and the growing ease of communicating information to prospective users, state-dependent pricing is still rare or nonexistent in many potential applications. In road transportation it has only been implemented on a few High Occupancy Toll (HOT) lanes in the U.S. On other roads tolls are either set according to a predictable schedule or are constant over time.
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There are several possible explanations for the dearth of state-dependent pricing. One is that the infrastructure and operating costs are (still) too high for it to be cost-effective (Levinson and Odlyzko, 2008) . Another is that individuals prefer simple and predictable pricing schemes and would find it difficult to deal with changing and possibly complex charges (Bonsall et al., 2007) .
A third and related obstacle is that state-dependent pricing can ration access efficiently only if prices are set far enough in advance of usage that individuals can adapt their usage plans. Legal barriers may also prevent charges being varied -perhaps on the grounds that doing so would be discriminatory. This paper examines another explanation for the rarity of state-dependent pricing: that individuals dislike price uncertainty per se. According to standard consumer theory individuals are approximately risk-neutral with respect to small monetary outlays. Yet there is a large body of evidence that even for stakes of just a few dollars individuals weigh monetary losses more than monetary gains. Individuals can also object strongly to price hikes that are not accompanied by an increase in supply or that do not seem to be justified by higher supplier costs (Frey and Pommerehne, 1993; Xia et al., 2004) . Raising prices to ration demand for a fixed supply, particularly in response to an infrequent and severe shortage such as in the aftermath of a hurricane, may even be considered repugnant (Roth, 2007) .
There is also a large body of evidence that attitudes towards variations in either service quality or prices are strongly influenced by expectations. The importance of expectations in determining attitudes towards congestion has long been recognized in the literature on outdoor recreation (Clawson and Knetsch, 1966) . Expectations can influence perceptions of crowding and willingness to pay for a visit more strongly than do actual encounters.
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Expectations also influence assessments of prices. Prices previously paid or prices charged at comparable facilities or under similar circumstances establish a benchmark or reference point against which new prices are judged. 3 Prices that exceed the benchmark may be considered excessive and may induce opposition or steep drops in demand.
When individuals are averse to fluctuations in service quality and fluctuations in prices, there is a tradeoff between varying prices according to Pigouvian principles to smooth congestion and keeping prices relatively constant to reduce price uncertainty. As noted above dynamic tolling is applied on a few HOT lanes and drivers are willing to forego certainty about payment in return for predictable (and shorter) travel times. However, HOT lanes offer drivers a readily understood and attractive option. Since tolls are adjusted to maintain free-flow conditions on the toll lanes the link between service quality and the level of the toll is clear. Furthermore, tolls are posted near the entrance to HOT lanes and drivers can choose at the last minute whether to pay the toll or take the adjacent toll-free lanes. State-dependent pricing may be less readily accepted for 2 See Stankey (1972) , Shelby et al. (1983) , and Michael and Reiling (1997) . It has long been alleged that employees at Disneyland parks overstate expected waiting times for rides. One explanation is that this practice encourages people to spend time at restaurants or other revenue-generating activities rather than joining queues. Another explanation is that visitors feel elated when waiting times turn out to be shorter than predicted. I am grateful to Terry Daniel for this information.
other types of road-pricing schemes or at other congestible facilities if it is difficult to avoid paying charges when they are high (Golob, 2001 ).
To explore the implications for state-dependent pricing of aversion to variations in service quality and prices this paper develops a model based on Kőszegi and Rabin's (2006) general model of reference-dependent preferences. To emphasize the generality of the model, users or prospective users of the facility will be called "agents". Using a facility yields an "intrinsic" utility and a "gain-loss" utility measured relative to the probability distribution over states of outcomes that result from the usage decisions an agent makes. Two types of preferences are analyzed: bundled preferences in which agents perceive gains and losses with respect to overall utility, and unbundled preferences in which they perceive gains and losses separately for the toll and other determinants of utility including time costs. For both types of preferences tolls are chosen to maximize the sum of expected utility and revenues. Tolls thus reflect public rather than private-sector objectives.
Studies of loss aversion typically find that reference-dependent effects decay as agents become familiar with gains and losses and can become negligible with sufficient experience (List, 2003) . This may explain why established practices of dynamically pricing airline tickets and access to HOT lanes have become widely accepted. To capture the effects of experience in the model it is assumed that a fraction of agents are "experienced" and do not perceive gains and losses. The model can be interpreted as one of overlapping generations in which a fraction of the population retires each period and is replaced by new, inexperienced agents.
Two studies that analyze some aspects of state-dependent pricing deserve mention. Emmerink et al. (1998) examine road pricing in a model where drivers are risk averse with respect to travel time but not the toll they pay. If drivers are informed about travel time before they start a trip they incur no uncertainty cost and the congestion toll is the standard, deterministic Pigouvian toll for the travel conditions that prevail that day. If no drivers are informed the toll is independent of the state and it is set above the Pigouvian toll to reflect the additional external cost that drivers impose by increasing travel time uncertainty. Finally, if a fraction of drivers are informed the toll is set above the Pigouvian charge when travel conditions are bad and below it when travel conditions are good. Doing so is beneficial because it reduces uncertainty in travel time for drivers who are not informed. As discussed later these results contrast with results generated in the current paper. Rotemberg (2008) develops a model of private-sector pricing that is similar in several respects to the model here. His model is based on the assumption that consumers give a firm the benefit of the doubt if they believe that the firm attaches some altruistic value for their wellbeing.
Consumers' beliefs are upset if the firm behaves in a contradictory way such as by raising the price of a good during a shortage. Consumers experience a psychological cost from price shocks that depends on the difference between the price they actually pay and the price they expected to pay. Rotemberg's model does not feature congestion but rather a fixed quantity of a good that has to be rationed somehow.
In the model used here the facility operator has full information about supply and demand and uses the information to set the toll. State-dependent pricing of this sort differs from responsive pricing as envisaged by Vickrey (1971) whereby the price is set according to a formula based on occupancy or some other measure of congestion. Responsive pricing operates in real time or near real time, but uses only limited, contemporaneous information about usage conditions that may be less than what agents themselves know. 4 For this reason, the term "statedependent pricing" is used here rather than "responsive pricing" or "dynamic pricing".
Section 2 develops the model, characterizes optimal usage decisions for inexperienced agents, and derives two general results on existence and uniqueness of individual or "personal" equilibrium decisions. Section 3 provides a more detailed analysis of usage decisions when there are two states that differ in terms of supply or demand conditions. Section 4 derives optimal tolls for two states and works through a numerical example. Section 5 summarizes the main results and identifies ways in which the model of reference-dependent pricing developed here could be generalized or modified. 5 4 Courty and Pagliero (2008) develop a model of responsive pricing in which agents decide how long to use a facility. They show that responsive pricing is generally not fully efficient because it fails to convey information about future prices that agents would like to know when they decide whether to initiate consumption. 5 A preliminary and partial version of this paper is developed in Lindsey (2009) . The current paper goes further by treating demand as well as capacity fluctuations, allowing some agents to be experienced, and deriving general results on existence and uniqueness of equilibrium.
THE MODEL

States and usage decisions
There is a single congestible facility. Both the state of the facility and demand can vary from day to day. Let  denote the (discrete) set of possible states on a given day and w h the probability of state w . 10 The modifier "unacclimating" is added by Kőszegi and Rabin (2007) .
11 As Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) 
, and
. For brevity, these candidates will be denoted YY, YN, and NN.
Candidate personal equilibria
In this subsection necessary and sufficient conditions for each candidate UPE are derived under Assumption G3 which encompasses both bundled and unbundled preferences. Section 3.2 carries the analysis further for bundled preferences, and Section 3.3 does so for unbundled preferences.
Candidate personal equilibrium YY
If usage on both Good and Bad days is the reference point, utility from usage on Good and Bad days is (cf eqn. (8)):
Gain-loss utility on Good days in eqn. (11) 
Candidate personal equilibrium YN
For candidate YN, the facility is only used on Good days. Utility on Good and Bad days is
   
Deviating from YN by forgoing usage on a Good day yields a utility
12 This is obvious for bundled preferences. For unbundled preferences (Assumption G4)  
Deviating from YN by undertaking usage on a Bad day yields a utility
Candidate YN is a UPE if and only if (using eqns. (14) and (16))
and (using eqns. (15) and (17))
Candidate personal equilibrium NN
Since
In summary, the conditions for UPE are (from eqns. (13), (18), (19), and (21)):
Bundled preferences
If gain-loss utility is bundled, then by Proposition 2 there exists a unique UPE in which the facility is used if and only if intrinsic utility is positive in the realized state. Consistent with Proposition 2, given Assumption G5, conditions (22)- (24) simplify to
Conditions (25)- (27) are mutually exclusive (except when they hold as equalities) and collectively exhaustive, and they coincide with the usage conditions for experienced agents who do not perceive gain-loss utility. This is true regardless of how Good days and Bad days differ in terms of supply and demand conditions.
Unbundled preferences
If gain-loss utility is not bundled, conditions (22)- (24) are not mutually exclusive and it is possible for two, or even all three, of YY, YN, and NN to be UPE. The signs of the gain-loss utility components in conditions (22)- (24) depend on whether Good and Bad days differ with respect to supply or demand, and the two cases need to be analyzed separately.
Variable supply
If usage conditions vary only respecting supply, the user cost functions
differ from each other but an agent's gross utility, v, is the same on Good and Bad days. To facilitate analysis the gain-loss utility function is assumed to satisfy Assumption G6. Conditions (22)- (24) for UPE become
Since 1 (28) is looser than condition (25); i.e. 
Variable demand
If demand varies, but not supply, the user cost functions  increases the perceived loss from paying the toll on a Good day if the agent is habituated to not using the facility.
14 One possible way to select between UPE is to use Kőszegi and Rabin's (2006) concept of a preferred personal equilibrium (PPE). As elaborated in the conclusions, decision d is a PPE if U U
the preferred decision when each feasible decision vector is evaluated relative to itself. PPE is typically unique.
Unfortunately, in the model here the PPE depends on parameter values and is therefore not a very tractable equilibrium selection approach.
15 Attention is thus restricted to unique UPE that result in lower aggregate usage than alternative UPE. This is reasonable insofar as no usage is the status quo before an agent has used a facility for the first time.
Conditions (32a) and (33) are the same as conditions (29a) and (30) for variable supply, but conditions (31) and (32b) differ from (28) and (29b). Since 
OPTIMAL TOLLS WITH TWO STATES
To derive optimal tolls it is necessary to specify the distribution of preferences of potential users.
The fraction of agents who are inexperienced will be denoted by f . For both experienced and inexperienced agents the distribution of gross utility differs between Good days and Bad days when demand is variable. For experienced agents the cumulative distribution on Good days will be denoted
 and the number of experienced users on Good days is
Using analogous notation, the number of experienced users on Bad days is
Inexperienced agents are assumed to have the same normalized distribution of gross utility as experienced agents;
. The numbers of inexperienced agents on Good days is V V   with unbundled preferences and variable demand.
Welfare will be measured by the sum of aggregate expected utility and expected toll revenue.
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As in Section 3, bundled preferences and unbundled preferences are analyzed separately and the gain-loss utility function is assumed to satisfy Assumption G6.
Bundled preferences
With bundled preferences, variable capacity and variable demand can be treated simultaneously. Expected utility for an experienced YY agent is
expected utility for an experienced YN agent is
and expected utility for an experienced NN agent is 0
For inexperienced YY agents, expected utility is
eqns. (11) and (12),
where
Given eqns. (14) and (15)     1 1
Finally, for inexperienced NN agents expected utility is 0
With bundled preferences the boundary gross utilities for inexperienced agents, B p and G p , are the same as for experienced agents. Consequently, expected utilities for experienced and inexperienced agents can be combined in the same integral. Indexing experienced and inexperienced agents together in order of decreasing gross utility, the expected utility for all agents can be written
and welfare is
Optimal tolls are derived by maximizing W in (40) with respect to G  and B  . The solution (see Equations (41) and (42) reveal that tolls play a dual role when agents have referencedependent preferences. One role is as a Pigouvian tax to control congestion, and the other is to smooth utility.
Unbundled preferences
With unbundled preferences, variable supply and variable demand have to be analyzed separately.
Variable supply
As described in Section 3. 
Expected toll revenue and welfare are again given by eqns. (39) and (40). First-order conditions for the tolls are written out in Appendix D; they do not simplify enough to be readily interpreted.
It is possible to show that if all agents are inexperienced ( 1 f  ) the toll on Good days may be 
Variable demand
Similar to the case with variable supply, with variable demand expected utilities for experienced and inexperienced agents need to be tallied separately. Aggregate expected utility is
The first line of eqn. (44) 
Summary
The analytical results derived in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 are summarized in 
Numerical examples
The analysis so far provides insights into whether tolls are increased or decreased when agents have reference-dependent preferences, but it does not indicate how much tolls are adjusted. To assess this, a simple numerical example is developed with one specification for variable supply and another for variable demand. The example is broadly descriptive of an urban automobile commute with utility measured in dollars.
Calibration
Variable supply
Gross utility from usage is assumed to be uniformly distributed over the interval   
There is little evidence on which to draw in selecting plausible values for  and  . The importance of gain-loss utility will depend on the nature of demand and supply shocks, agents' experience with state-dependent pricing, and other context-specific considerations.
21
In a theoretical paper, Laciana and Weber (2008) make the "somewhat arbitrary assumption" (p.10) that gain-loss utility does not exceed 10% of intrinsic utility. This is equivalent to assuming 20 The doubling of the slope on Bad days might happen if half road capacity becomes unavailable. 21 There is evidence that price adjustment is less acceptable for demand shocks than for supply shocks that are accompanied by an increase in supplier costs.
 
here.
22
By contrast, Rotemberg (2008) uses an example with parameters equivalent to 1   . As far as the loss aversion parameter, values for  of 2 or more have been estimated, or assumed, in various studies. To be conservative,  is set to 2. In each scenario optimal tolls were calculated for values of  ranging from zero up to the largest value consistent with the utility rankings assumed in the scenario.
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Variable demand
For variable demand, the slope of the user cost function is assumed to be 
Results
Figures 1 to 4 present tolls for scenarios in which all agents are inexperienced. Figure 1 shows the results for bundled preferences and variable supply. With 0   , the tolls are G  =$3.50 and B  =$5.60. As  rises, G  increases and B  decreases (consistent with eqns. (41) and (42)), and at 0.14   the tolls converge at about $4.00. Thus, when the weight on gains and losses reaches just one seventh the (implicit) weight of unity on intrinsic utility it is optimal to set the same tolls on Good and Bad days and the tolls are no longer state-dependent. A similar pattern occurs with unbundled preferences and variable supply in Figure 2 except that G  22 Laciana and Weber's example is developed in the context of regret theory, whereas Kőszegi and Rabin's (2006) model features disappointment rather than regret. It is not obvious in general whether utility is more or less strongly influenced by regret than by disappointment. With unbundled preferences, the effects of f have to be determined numerically. This was done for variable supply and variable demand by fixing parameter  at the value shown in Figures 2 and 4 at which the tolls converge, and computing equilibria over the range
As shown in Figures 5 and 6 , tolls on both Good and Bad days vary approximately linearly with f. Thus, similar to the case with bundled preferences, the influence of inexperienced agents in determining tolls is roughly proportional to their relative numbers.
The finding that inexperienced agents "matter" as much as experienced agents in determining optimal tolls is surprising in one respect. Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985) and Fehr and Tyran where choices are strategic substitutes such as the congestible facility considered here. However, "experience" in their context refers to knowledge about usage conditions. In the context here, all agents are perfectly informed and "experience" determines preferences instead. Similar to the market trading setting considered by List (2003) , inexperience has a first-order effect on usage decisions and optimal congestion pricing policy.
CONCLUSIONS
Supply and demand shocks are common on roads and at recreational areas and other congestible facilities. According to social marginal cost pricing principles, congestion tolls or admission fees should vary with usage conditions. Yet, despite advances in pricing technology and growing ease of communicating information, state-dependent pricing is still rare. One explanation is that individuals dislike varying prices. This paper analyzes aversion to price variation by developing a model of reference-dependent preferences based on Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) . Using a facility yields an "intrinsic" utility and a "gain-loss" utility measured relative to the probability distribution over states of outcomes that result from the usage decisions an agent makes. Two types of reference-dependent preferences are considered: bundled preferences in which agents perceive gains and losses with respect to overall utility, and unbundled preferences in which they perceive gains and losses separately for the toll and other determinants of utility.
Usage decisions are assumed to be individually optimal if an agent is at an unacclimating personal equilibrium (UPE). Under weak assumptions on the gain-loss utility function, a UPE always exists. With bundled preferences UPE is unique, but with unbundled preferences multiple UPE can exist. Individually optimal usage decisions depend on the strength of gain-loss utility and whether usage conditions vary with supply or demand.
Optimal tolls are derived for a special case of the model with two states, a given fraction of agents who are inexperienced and perceive gains and losses, and a linear gain-loss utility function. With bundled preferences the toll pattern is clear-cut: on Good days the toll is set above the benchmark Pigouvian toll, and on Bad days the toll is set below it. Adjusting tolls in this way reduces variability in utility and the magnitude of net gain-loss disutility. The size of the adjustments is proportional to the fraction of agents who are inexperienced. With unbundled preferences, optimal toll policy depends on whether supply or demand is variable. Under plausible conditions the toll on Bad days is set below the Pigouvian toll if supply is variable, but above the Pigouvian toll if demand is variable. A numerical example shows that for both types of preferences tolls are sensitive to the strength of gain-loss utility and vary roughly in proportion to the fraction of agents who are inexperienced. Except with unbundled preferences and variable demand, Good-day and Bad-day tolls converge when all agents are inexperienced and the weight on "gain-loss" utility reaches a modest fraction of the weight on intrinsic utility. Stateindependent tolling is then optimal.
There are various directions in which the modeling of reference-dependent pricing could be generalized or modified. A few are identified here.
Perfect information
One restrictive assumption of the model is that prospective users are perfectly informed about the state when they make their usage decisions. This assumption has the advantage that the model is applicable not only to stochastic fluctuations in usage conditions but also to predictable, recurring fluctuations such as weekly peaks in demand or seasonal variations in access to recreational areas. The model applies to deterministic peak-load pricing if the probability distribution of states, w h , is interpreted to be the fraction of time that each condition applies.
25
Another reason for assuming perfect information is that state-dependent pricing would be pointless if agents know nothing about the state.
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Nevertheless, it would be more realistic to suppose that agents have access only to imperfect information such as regional weather reports or news bulletins about accidents. Studies of outdoor recreation, for example, find that infrequent 25 Another consequence of the perfect-information assumption is that the model excludes regret. When gain-loss
 is negative, an agent experiences "disappointment" that outcome z occurred rather than outcome
 is positive, the agent feels "elation". But agents never experience regret from taking one decision when another decision would have yielded a higher utility in the state that actually occurs.
visitors often fail to predict congestion levels accurately and may not know what to expect (Prince and Ahmed, 1988; Shelby et al., 1983) .
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Nature of the reference point
In Kőszegi and Rabin's (2006) model, the reference point is the complete lottery of outcomes that result from an agent's usage decisions. Alternative specifications of the reference point have been proposed in the literature. Gul (1991) uses the certainty equivalent of a lottery, Grant and Kajii (1998) use the best outcome, and Sugden (2003) assumes that outcomes are compared with the reference lottery state by state rather than with the whole lottery.
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The assumption that agents evaluate outcomes relative to the full set of possibilities is conceivable if there are few states, but it is unlikely that people have the cognitive capacity or motivation to assess satisfaction relative to many reference points. Evaluation using multiple outcomes is more plausible if the stakes are high, and if reference points are easily compared (Ordóñez et al., 2000) ; e.g. if they are defined just by travel time and a toll. Recent experience is probably more salient than experience in the distant past. For example, McCarville (1996) found that price last paid strongly influences current price expectations for visitors to recreational facilities.
Use of unacclimating personal equilibrium as the solution concept
In a UPE as defined in eqn. (10), alternative decision rules (  d ) are evaluated using the candidate UPE decision rule ( d ) as the reference point. Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) develop another solution concept that they call preferred personal equilibrium (PPE). Decision rule d is a PPE if it is a UPE and if it is preferred to every alternative decision rule when each rule is evaluated relative to itself:
A PPE is typically unique even if there are multiple UPE. Kőszegi and Rabin (2007) develop a third solution concept called choice-acclimating personal equilibrium (CPE). CPE is defined by 27 Agents may also have biased perceptions. For example, attendance at New England ski areas during the winter of 1989 was low because people mistakenly thought that snow conditions were poor (Shelby et al., 1989) . 28 The counterpart to eqn. (9) in Sugden's (2003) 
the same condition (45) but without the requirement that the CPE also be a UPE. UPE and PPE are solution concepts that take expectations and the reference point as given. By contrast, in a CPE the agent recognizes that selecting a decision rule determines not only the vector of possible outcomes but also the reference point. Which of the three solution concepts (UPE, PPE, CPE) is appropriate in a given setting depends on various considerations including how rapidly agents adapt their expectations after a choice has been made.
Including gain-loss utility in the welfare function
The welfare function used in Section 4 to derive optimal tolls includes the gain-loss utility perceived by inexperienced agents, and thus respects the principle of consumer sovereignty. No
consensus has yet emerged in the literature on whether the principle should be followed for policy assessment when agents have non-standard preferences.
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One could argue that tolls should be based only on intrinsic preferences since once agents have gained experience with state-dependent pricing, Pigouvian tolls will be optimal given their actual preferences. The need to periodically adjust tolls while agents are learning would be avoided. However, several opposing arguments can be made. First, individual agents may never completely adapt. 29 See Kahneman and Sugden (2005) , Bernheim and Rangel (2007) , and Sugden (2008) .
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The difference in utility between usage and no usage in state w is
Given only Assumptions G1 and G2 it is not possible to sign 
Given only Assumptions G1 and G2 it is not possible to sign 0w
 and the sign of (A2) is therefore also indeterminate. 
All six terms in (B6) are positive since 0 w u  . The proof that usage is not warranted for
Substituting ( 
and
Substituting (C5) and (C6) into (C4) yields eqn. (42) for B  .
Appendix D: Optimal tolls with unbundled preferences
Variable supply
Welfare is given by eqns. (39), (40) and (43): 
